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INTRODUCTION: ARCHITECTURE 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT FROM A
HEIDEGGERIAN PERSPECTIVE
The German sociologist Ulrich Beck has well
characterized the present predicament:
The transformation of the unseen side-effects of
industrial production into global ecological
trouble spots is … not at all a problem of the
world surrounding us-not a so-called
“environmental problem”—but a far-reaching
institutional crisis of industrial society itself….
What previously appeared “functional” and
“rational” now becomes and appears to be a
threat to life, and therefore produces and
legitimates dysfunctionality and irrationality….
Just as earlier generations lived in the age of the
stagecoach, so we now and in future are living
in the hazardous age of creeping catastrophe.
When generations before us discovered
despite resistance, and had to shout out loud at
the world, we have come to take for granted: the
impending “suicide of the species” …1
In the face of this predicament, Beck argued, ethics
can be compared to “a bicycle brake on an
intercontinental jet.”2 It is virtually impossible to
imagine the discourse of ethics being able to have
significant impact on the forces leading to the
destruction of the global environment. The emerging
conventional view is that the only hope for the future
lies in developing more energy-efficient and less
polluting technologies, discovering new forms of
energy, increasing the efficiency of agriculture, better
comprehending and managing ecosystems, and
better understanding markets to harness the
entrepreneurial talents of capitalists to implement the
discoveries of science.3 If ethics is regarded as
irrelevant in an age of creeping catastrophe, what
role could art (even when broadly conceived to
include architecture) play? Looked at in this light, it
would appear that art is virtually irrelevant to
addressing environmental problems, although
architecture might play some role in developing
more energy-efficient buildings. Art is even more
ineffectual than ethics.
However, Martin Heidegger advanced the
provocative thesis that science is fundamentally
limited and that it is to art that we should look for
salvation. Science, Heidegger argued, enframes the
world to reveal it only as standing reserve to be
dominated. It is the very quest for control, which is
problematic.4 Nature and even people are now
evaluated only as instruments. It is this way of
thinking that has created a global ecological crisis,
and the crisis will not be solved through such
thinking. Heidegger called for an inversion of the
standing granted to science, ethics, and art. “Ethics”
emerged in Ancient Greece with Plato and Aristotle
when thinking was becoming a science, and to the
present day is contaminated by the same
domineering orientation. What is really needed is not
the abstract thinking of science or ethics but a
different “ethos”; that is, a different way of dwelling
on the earth, a way of dwelling such that Being is
revealed.5 How can this be achieved? Heidegger
invoked art. Art reveals (that is, unveils) the Being of
beings to reveal their truth as presencing. Truth
(conceived of as unconcealedness of beings) and
beauty are indissociable. As Heidegger put it: “Truth
is the truth of being. Beauty does not occur
alongside and apart from this truth. When truth sets
itself into the work, it shines forth. The shining forth—
as this being [here to be understood actively and
transitively] of truth in the work and as work—is
beauty. Thus the beautiful belongs in the self-
happening of truth.”6
Artworks are events of truth to which belongs the
beautiful, and these events open a path to dwelling
in the light of Being.
Buildings and architecture as forms of art are crucial
to this. They are happenings of truth, sites or places
in which geometrical space is subordinated to the
more primordial possibility of an event in excess of
the merely physical or of the merely human, an event
in which the human finds its proper place: its home.
Buildings open the possibility of genuine dwelling,
not just amid things, but as the event of the coming
into presence of things out of a non-thingly horizon.
As Heidegger wrote of a Greek temple:
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It is the temple-work that first fits together and at
the same time gathers around itself the unity of
those paths and relations in which birth and
death, disaster and blessing, victory and
disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the
shape of destiny for human being…. The
temple-work, standing there, opens up a world
and at the same time sets this world back again
on earth, which itself only thus emerges as
native ground.7
Through art, and architecture in particular, man
dwells poetically on this earth.8 The challenge for
architecture is to make possible such dwelling, and
architecture is beautiful when it does so. It is
suggested, without ever being claimed, that dwelling
in this way is what is required to properly respond to
the ecological crisis.
EVALUATING HEIDEGGER
How can we evaluate such provocative
suggestions? Heidegger’s oracular style and
language have made it difficult to assess his work.
Most of his disciples devote themselves to
exegesis, as though to have shown how
Heidegger developed his ideas and what he really
meant is to attain the truth. Even from this
perspective, Heidegger promises little to those
concerned with addressing the global ecological
crisis. After supporting Nazism, Heidegger
adopted a very passive orientation to the problems
he identified. In the face of the “extreme danger”
that “the frenziedness of technology may entrench
itself everywhere,” Heidegger concluded that “The
closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do
the ways into the saving power begin to shine and
the more questioning we become. For questioning
is the piety of thought.”9 At best we can hope to
recover what had been revealed to the Ancient
Greeks, who were quite destructive of their natural
environment. Taking a more critical stance towards
Heidegger, Fredric Jameson concludes that:
“Heidegger’s ‘field path’ is, after all, irredeemably
and irrevocably destroyed by late capital, by the
green revolution, by neocolonialism and the
megalopolis, which runs its superhighways over
the older f ields and vacant lots and turns
Heidegger’s ‘house of being’ into condominiums, if
not the most miserable unheated, rat-infested
tenement buildings.”10
This is not simply a gratuitous display of disrespect
for Heidegger. It suggests that Heidegger’s
diagnosis of the problem is incomplete—it is a claim
that we can no longer dwell in the world as
suggested by Heidegger because the global market
no longer permits it. Heidegger’s call for authentic
dwelling is irrelevant before the destructive power of
global capitalism. In his study of Heidegger’s critique
of modernity and its relevance for the environment,
Michael Zimmerman is even more critical.11
Zimmerman finally comes to the conclusion that
Heidegger’s philosophy was fundamentally flawed,
undermining its own critical force, something
Heidegger himself came to appreciate. As
Zimmerman puts it:
Heidegger could read modernity as the most
constricted mode of disclosure only by viewing
Western history as decline and fall from a nobler
origin. Eventually abandoning this view, he could
say only that technological modernity excluded
the ancient Greek disclosure of being, but ancient
Greece excluded the technological disclosure. I
would add that ancient Greece also excluded
modernity’s egalitarian commitments.12
This would seem to provide even more reason to
dismiss Heidegger.
However, Heidegger’s work belongs to the tradition
which began with the early Romantics of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.13
Influenced by Kant, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, and
Fichte, it was a reaction against the prevailing ideas
of the Enlightenment: the mechanistic view of nature,
the atomistic view of society, and a highly abstract
notion of rationality. The most outstanding
representative of this tradition, and the figure who
defined its goals, was Schelling. Heidegger was far
more indebted to Schelling than he acknowledged,
as Sonya Sikka has shown.14 It was Schelling who
argued that art is superior to science as a means to
comprehend ultimate reality and who opposed the
reduction of nature to a mere instrument for human
purposes. It was also Schelling who argued in
opposition to Hegelian idealism that there is an
“unprethinkable being” preceding all thought,
particularly reflective thought. Schelling not only
developed a profound critique of the approach to
nature of the sciences very similar to Heidegger’s
and influenced the tradition of hermeneutics with
which Heidegger aligned himself, following Herder
and Goethe; he also attempted to lay the
foundations for a new form of post-mechanistic
science in which nature is seen as first and foremost
“productivity” or process, and only derivatively as
“products” or things. This has developed as the
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tradition of process thought, a tradition that includes
Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead and the scientists
such as Ilya Prigogine, David Bohm, and Brian
Goodwin influenced by them.15 If we evaluate
Heidegger’s work as the contribution of a highly
original thinker to the developing tradition of thought
begun by the early German Romantics, not as a
finished body of ideas but as a possible creative
advance within this tradition, then we do not have to
either embrace Heidegger’s work as a whole or
dismiss it because of its obvious failings. We can
assess his analysis of modernity and claims for art,
assimilate his insights, and go beyond him.
When viewed in this way, Heidegger’s claim that his
own work is fundamentally different and much
deeper than science or speculative metaphysics is
no longer tenable; but this makes his insights more
defensible. While Heidegger himself might have
concluded that he had no basis for judging the
superiority of one way of revealing the world over
another, when seen as part of the broader tradition
of process thought and the struggle to overcome
the mechanistic world view, Heidegger’s work can
be seen as a contribution to this struggle for a more
adequate comprehension of nature and our place
within it. From this perspective, it is not enough to
note that the space and time of science are
incompatible with space and time as it is lived; it is
necessary to revise the notions of space and time
within science to make intelligible the possibility of
lived space and time. Such ideas can be evaluated
according to how they overcome the blind spots
and aporias of rival ways of understanding the
world. Advancing process thought, Heidegger has
also advanced our understanding of what it is to
understand the world. In particular, Heidegger has
helped overcome the bias in favor of contemplative
thinking and visual analogies. Process metaphysics
should no longer be understood as a “world view”
but as a mode of being in the world whereby it
discloses itself and ourselves more adequately.
What matters most is not how we think about the
world contemplatively but how we orient ourselves
while practically engaged within it; that is, how we
dwell within it. For speculative metaphysicians and
scientists, what is important is not so much the
ability to manipulate abstractions in order to make
correct predictions, but (in Michael Polanyi’s
terminology) to make sense of the world by using
these abstractions to more adequately “indwell” in
what we are trying to understand.16
BEYOND HEIDEGGER
Going beyond Heidegger, we can see that the
modern way of enframing the world as standing
reserve is not merely a matter of the forgetting of
Being. It is an orientation reinforced and extended
by the dynamics of the global market. This is being
promoted and manipulated by powerful states and
the wealthy elites who control them, emancipated
from democratic control in any meaningful sense, as
a means to accelerate economic growth, exploit their
working classes, and exploit the resources of poorer
nations more effectively while providing the military
means to maintain and extend the market and
control access to resources. Treating the world as a
world of things to be exploited is legitimated by
mainstream economic theory, management theory,
social Darwinism, Darwinist evolutionary theory, and
mainstream reductionist science generally, all of
which cohere as the integrated world view of
scientific (or mechanistic) materialism.17 The global
market, techno-science, and the scientific materialist
cosmology which supports these are associated
with massive concentrations of power that have
neutralized almost all opposition to its present
dynamics. The commodification of even the most
creative art by the culture industry is an aspect of
this neutralization. The situation is far worse than that
portrayed by Heidegger. Miguel de Beistegui, in his
study of Heidegger, states that
The question, with respect to our contemporary
situation, is to know the extent to which the
global economy—an economy beyond the
general economy of the polis, for no longer tied
to the polis of the nation-state, an economy, in
other words, which has transformed our very
being, and set itself almost entirely free from the
“place” in which it was traditionally anchored,
reconfiguring also the private space itself as no
longer private, but as entirely traversed by this
essentially fluid and plastic force: capitalism—
that is sweeping us away is not simply a state
of homelessness depriving us of any sense of
place, deterritorializing the nation and the
homeland…. Is there not, in such a context, an
erring and a lack of place far more threatening
and colossal than anything hitherto
experienced, a sort of perpetual banishment
fed and kept alive by the economic machine?18
Any place with the slightest trace of authentic
dwelling is immediately packaged to attract the
tourist dollar (with tourism now accounting for twenty
per cent of all greenhouse gas emissions). With
virtually every aspect of nature and social life
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commodified and subject to the logic of the global
market, almost all effective resistance to its
destructive imperatives has dissolved. Throughout
the world people have been seduced into giving up
their political power (that is, democracy) for the
promise of higher levels of consumption that a
globally free market will supposedly deliver. Since the
1970s when the environment was first put on the
agenda, this logic has accelerated the rate of virtually
every form of environmental destruction, despite the
emergence of a global environment movement.19
What could stop these destructive dynamics? We
know from the failure of communism that a centrally
planned economy is not the solution. One plausible
program is to revive democracy, the power of the
people to shape their destiny for the common good,
wresting power from existing power elites and
subordinating the market to the common good of the
whole of humanity including future generations.
There are enormous obstacles standing in the way of
achieving this, not least the power of the power
elites, but the most problematic is the dominance of
the prevailing scientific materialist cosmology which
construes life as a struggle for survival and
domination, values above all the unlimited power to
satisfy appetites, and denies even the possibility of
self-determination, a construal of life continuously
reconfirmed by the behaviour of people within a
market economy. While Heidegger had virtually
nothing to say about freedom and democracy and
the scientific materialist cosmology, these were
central concerns of the broader tradition to which he
belonged. Fichte argued that it is only through being
recognized by others as free that we become free
agents, and freedom consists in limiting ourselves in
accordance with the appreciation of others as free.
That is, humans become free, self-determining
agents only through their relations to other people
whereby the freedom of others is acknowledged.
Schelling developed his alternative conception of
nature to justify this conception of humans, which
were then seen as emergent phenomena within a
dynamic, creative nature. This is the conception of
humans and their place within nature required to
support the struggle for genuine democracy able to
appreciate the creativity of both people and natural
processes and act accordingly.
Much work has been done elaborating this
cosmology and developing it as an alternative
foundation for the sciences. However, there are
major difficulties in developing science on these
foundations. When setting up experiments the aim
is to set up initial conditions, controlling the
environment and constituents of entities so as to be
able to predict outcomes. This approach does not
give a place to immanent causation of processes
and our own participation in the dynamics of what
is being investigated. There is also the problem of
giving a place to mathematics (which implies
determinism) in the world while reconciling this with
a conception of nature as creative process. While
efforts are being made to deal with these problems,
the work is at such an abstract level and is so
difficult to comprehend that it is diff icult to
persuade on this basis more than a small minority
of people that they need to fundamentally alter their
modes of being in the world. However, such
problems have almost invariably led exponents of
this alternative tradition to appreciate art as
complementary to science in comprehending the
world. To effect a fundamental transformation of our
modes of being in the world, art, with its cognitive
claims properly defended, could be more important
than post-mechanistic science. And it is in this
context that Heidegger’s work can be appreciated,
although appreciating its full significance requires
that it be reinterpreted.
Heidegger can be interpreted as forging a new
language (usually by privileging verbs over nouns)
to enable people to understand themselves as
creative participants within a creative nature; that
is, in a world of processes. By developing this to
illuminate the mode of being in the world of the
Ancient Greeks, he was able to expose the taken-
for-granted assumptions of modernity which have
hidden from people both the creative activity of
processes within their world and also their
indebtedness to this creative activity in their own
becoming and in their productive activities. Most
importantly, those assumptions have hidden from
people the meaning of processes in nature, in
social l ife, and in their own individual l ives.
Heidegger’s new language not only enables
people to appreciate these processes but also
shows how works of ar t and their buildings
disclose people’s worlds and thereby the
meanings of their lives. Of the arts, no art form has
greater impact on the way people experience and
orient themselves within the world than
architecture. That is, the original tentative
suggestion, repudiated by Heidegger himself, that
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art generally and architecture in particular might
play a fundamental role in engendering a superior
ethos or way of dwelling in the world, is justified
when Heidegger is reinterpreted as part of the
tradit ion of process thought deriving from
Schelling. Rather than lamenting a lost mode of
revealing Being, architecture can be appreciated
as central to the struggle to develop a more
adequate way of dwelling which discloses the
world as interrelated processes rather than as
merely a collection of things.
REVOLUTIONIZING ARCHITECTURE: 
THE WORK OF CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER
While Heidegger has had a major impact on
architectural theory through the influence of his
notion of lived space,20 it is Christopher Alexander,
an architectural theorist who has not been influenced
by Heidegger, who has made the most vigorous
effort to overcome the form of architecture and town
planning that discloses the world and people only as
standing reserve. Alexander did not conceive his
work in such terms and has shown little interest in
ecological problems. His concern has been to
provide the means for people to create beautiful
buildings, buildings that enable people to feel at
home. This, Alexander believes, is the condition for
basic improvements in the institutions of society
required to put things right socially. To this end, he
has attempted to develop an approach to
architecture that focuses on living processes, and
was led to examine not only the order underlying all
that we build, including cities in all ages, but all that
grows throughout nature. Opposing the underlying
mechanistic assumptions which, he contends,
pervade modernist architecture, he has aligned
himself with the tradition of process thought and with
post-mechanistic science. He claims that
architecture can now play a leading role in
developing this new understanding of the world.
That is, Alexander belongs to the same tradition of
thought going back to Goethe and Schelling to
which Heidegger, process metaphysicians, and
post-mechanistic scientists belong. My contention is
that concern with processes leads to a different
mode of disclosing the world. People are led to
experience themselves as participants in an active
world rather than as subjects trying to control it.
Alexander’s life and work exemplify this, leading to
the struggle within architecture for a more adequate
way of dwelling in the world in accordance with the
process tradition of thought. It is this reorientation
which could fulfill Heidegger’s intimation that
architecture could change the way people dwell
within the world and change what they aspire to, a
change that could be central to overcoming the
destructive forces of modernity and to creating
environmentally sustainable forms of life.
Alexander was preoccupied from his student days
with the question of what makes things, especially
buildings, beautiful. He believed that most people
agree on what is beautiful; it is a quality of reality
that most people have no difficulty appreciating. He
also believed that most people could see that it is
mostly old buildings and cities that are beautiful; if
people are honest, they can see that modernist
architecture is not beautiful, it is oppressive and
ugly. He believed this to be a fact about reality, not a
subjective view. The evolution of Alexander’s ideas
was largely a matter of clarifying the nature of
beauty with a view to enabling people to create
beautiful buildings. He first set out to discover what
is actually going on in good design. Originally, he
argued that the object of design is form, and that
the problem of design is to fit the form (over which
we have control) to its context, which puts demands
on this form. He argued that “A well-designed
house not only fits its context well but also
illuminates the problem of just what the context is.”21
Alexander attempted to show a deep underlying
correspondence between the pattern of a problem
and the process of designing a physical form
answering that problem. The structure, if successful,
will clarify the life it accommodates. This led to a
concern to explicitly map the problem’s structure
and to provide a language to do so, enabling end
users to participate in the design process.
Alexander’s focus was on the design process by
which people make beautiful buildings rather than
on the buildings as end products. As his ideas
evolved, process came to be emphasized more and
more. Initially, Alexander portrayed problems and
their solutions as hierarchical structures, the
solutions being an exact counterpart to the
functional hierarchy established during the analysis
of the problems. However, he soon came to see that
the free functioning of the system depended not so
much on meeting a set of external requirements but
on the system’s coming to terms with itself, being in
balance with the forces generated internally by the
system. After comparing planned cities and
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unplanned cities, he came to see that it was the tree-
like structure of plans with all spaces being allotted
to particular functions that deadened social life and
alienated people. Noting that self-respecting
children far prefer to play in abandoned construction
sites than in playgrounds, which are cut off from the
rest of society and where everything they can do has
been planned, Alexander realized that planned cities
have fragmented social life and have prescribed
what is to be done in each functional space,
eliminating any room for creativity. In his famous
paper “A City is Not a Tree,” he argues that the
richness of pattern of unplanned cities, a richness
manifest in their vibrancy, is the result of an
overlapping structure that interrelates social activities
and leaves open the possibility for ever new uses of
space.22 They [Author: do you mean cities, structures
or spaces? Please clarify.] are semi-lattices.
Reflections on these issues led Alexander to focus
on the processes which actually produce the
structures of environments, that is, on “generativity.”
Pursuing this line of inquiry led Alexander to see that
the environment consists of relations or patterns
rather than things, and that these patterns are
generated by language-like systems of rules.
Patterns are recurring problems along with the
solutions to these (such as reconciling a range of
needs) which can be used a million times over
without ever doing so in exactly the same way.
“Things” are merely convenient labels we give to
patterns or bundles of patterns. Alexander was
concerned with those patterns which solve some sort
of architectural or social problem, which are
embodied in the structures we build. Patterns work
by co-existing, competing, and co-operating in some
dynamic balance to build up complex wholes, which
in turn form higher-level patterns, generating a
complex fabric from relatively simple generative
rules. On this assumption Alexander attempted to
develop a pattern language based on identifying
rules operating at all levels of the environment to
analyze and facilitate the interaction of human needs
in space as a generative process comparable to the
form-generating processes in nature. This language
was designed to enable lay people to participate in
the design process. He argues that “towns and
buildings will not be able to become alive, unless
they are made by all the people in society, and unless
these people share a common pattern language,
within which to make these buildings, and unless this
common pattern language is alive itself.” 23
Increasingly, Alexander was seeing the generation of
form in buildings as merely a special case (with
“needs” being a particular kind of force) of the
generation of form throughout nature, and that such
form generation is the essence of life. Beauty was
now equated with life. As Alexander put it, “The
beauty of a thing is not purely in how it looks. It has
to do with how it is. Now how it ‘is’ essentially
involves a relationship between the various events
that are going on there…. So it is ultimately the inner
life which is the thing that matters.”24 Concerned with
living both in relation to the design and building
activities and in relation to people affected by the
resulting buildings, Alexander concluded that this
must lead to a new understanding of nature:
I have come to believe that the problem of
physical order—the kind of order which creates
quality in architecture … this problem is of so
great a stature, that we shall have to modify our
picture of the whole physical universe in order to
see it clearly…. I believe we are on the threshold
of a new era, when this relationship between
architecture and the physical sciences may be
reversed—when the proper understanding of
the deep questions of space, as they are
embodied in architecture … will play a
revolutionary role in the way we see the world.25
It was this conviction that led Alexander to embark
upon his most important work, a study of the nature
of order. At the time he embarked on this, Alexander
thought he would write one book. It is now a four-
volume work, The Nature of Order: An Essay on the
Art of Building and the Nature of the Universe,
consisting of Book One, The Phenomenon of Life,
Book Two, The Process of Creating Life, Book Three,
A Vision of a Living World, and Book Four, The
Luminous Ground.
In these works, Alexander characterizes the
discipline of architecture as “a mass psychosis of
unprecedented dimension, in which the people of
earth … have created a form of architecture which is
against life, insane, image-ridden, hollow.”26 He
attributes this to the domination of the mechanist-
rationalist picture of the world. To combat this,
Alexander elaborates a new view of order in terms of
which “statements about relative degree of harmony,
or life, or wholeness—basic aspects of order—are
understood as potentially true or false.”27 Alexander’s
work on order is similar to, although not identical
with, complexity theory. His ideas are particularly
close to the speculations on order and wholeness of
the physicist David Bohm. However, drawing on his
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work in his own architecture and on the design
process, Alexander has made an original and
significant contribution to the tradition of process
thought. Providing a sharable perspective based on
a holistic view of the goal of life, Alexander aspires to
enable people to work together, reconciling the
many factors and needs influencing the
environment, to make buildings with a profound,
living order; that is, to create beautiful buildings.
Architecture would again be aligned with life.
THE RELEVANCE OF ALEXANDER 
TO THE GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL CRISIS
Alexander has gone well beyond the speculative
thinking of architects influenced by Heidegger; he is
engaged in a struggle to transform architectural
practice. While he has not addressed himself to the
global ecological crisis, the development of his ideas
has led him towards a new way of disclosing nature
and people as other than standing reserve, as life
with its own internal dynamics. In developing these
ideas there has been an astonishing convergence
with Heidegger in granting centrality to process over
things, and in allowing appreciation of significance
within the world. Most importantly, despite
appearances, the way Alexander understands the
beautiful is strikingly similar to Heidegger’s. The
beautiful is life, understood as the harmonious
ordering of diverse forces and events, disclosed as
such in all its relationships (being in the light of
Being) and augmented with this disclosing. Like
Heidegger, Alexander has been concerned with our
sense of place in the world and is concerned to
recreate the feeling of belonging, which at the same
time is to clarify (or reveal) what this belonging is.
Through architecture, he has exposed and offered
alternatives to not only the assumptions underlying
modernist architecture, but also the institutions of
modernity which have generated the global
ecological crisis. His work is a major contribution to
developing a cosmology that does justice to life and
our experience of it as beautiful.
Alexander has addressed more fully than
Heidegger the social dimension of our relation to
the world and the effect of the market on society.
He has forged a real, practical alternative to
instrumentalist/functionalist thinking and has
struggled to provide the means by which the public
can participate in designing and building beautiful
environments. It is a challenge to the notion of
architects selling a special expertise to the public
which takes out of the public’s hands any
participation in the building of its environments.
Perhaps more importantly, Alexander is concerned
to overcome the division between the public and
the private and to recreate or revive those spaces
and institutions that in the past mediated between
individuals and the State. This is associated with
efforts to revive institutions and corporations as
self-organizing processes. That is, through
architecture, Alexander is addressing the
atomization of society and the corrosion of public
life, institutions, and organizations that have
undermined real democracy.
The implications of Alexander’s work for the global
ecological crisis can be clearly seen when we
consider what his work implies for individuals. It has
been widely noted how the atomizing functionalism
dominating the modern world has dehumanized
people. Having lost the unity of the social and the
individual, people have lost their individuality, their
power as citizens, and, with the globalization of the
economy, their economic security. They have been
swindled into an endless pursuit of money to
compensate for what they have lost. They consume
more than ever before because, as Baudrillard
notes, they now are consuming symbols rather than
what is useful.28 They buy commodities to define their
identities, but once bought, these commodities
almost immediately lose their symbolic significance.
Consequently, consumers can never be satisfied.
And to escape the emptiness and ugliness of their
own environments they become tourists, but take
this emptiness with them and debase everywhere
they visit with their presence. Alexander promises to
regenerate life by engaging such people in
designing and building beautiful environments,
reviving their social spaces and their institutions to
enrich their lives and their appreciation of beauty.
Involving people in this way requires of them that
they come to understand in a practical way a
cosmology that validates their experiences of beauty
and life. If this project is successful, people will dwell
within the world in a different way and again be
aligned with life, and with revived communities, they
will also be empowered to further the interests of life.
At this stage it is difficult to finally assess Alexander’s
work and its potential. The successful appropriation
of his ideas by computer scientists gives some
indication of the power and generality of his analysis
of order. This project is a major advance in the
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tradition of process thought, a tradition developed in
opposition to mechanistic thinking and the social
order founded upon it. By calling for a transformation
of architecture on this basis to enable people to
appreciate and participate in the creation of beauty,
Alexander is promoting a mode of dwelling on earth
that will reveal and augment life. While architecture
by itself is unlikely to overcome the destructive
power of the global market and the political
institutions and power elites which are now
supporting it,29 once the problems he is grappling
with and the relationship between these and the
broader tradition of process thought are understood,
it is difficult to imagine the global ecological crisis
being addressed successfully without the kind of
revolution in architecture that Alexander is striving to
bring about. ■
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